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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
Introduction
During this survey period the Tenth Circuit decided more
than a hundred cases involving federal jurisdiction, the Federal
Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, and other issues relating to
practice in the federal courts. Many of the cases arose under the
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts and are of interest here
only in the procedural or jurisdictional context.
Although few of these cases represent issues of first impres-
sion, the overview which follows presents a limited discussion of
a representative number of cases, to indicate the types of legal
issues dealt with by the Tenth Circuit during this period. Follow-
ing the overview are comments on two areas of greater import-
ance, class action certification and availability of mandamus re-
lief from discovery orders.
Throughout the entire Federal Practice and Procedure sec-
tion, all references to rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, unless otherwise indicated.
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
A. In Personam Jurisdiction; Minimum Contacts
In Eckles v. Sharman,I the Tenth Circuit concluded that a
California corporation, owner of the Los Angeles Lakers basket-
ball team, had sufficient direct contacts in Utah for the United
States District Court for the District of Utah to exercise in per-
sonam jurisdiction by service under Utah's long-arm statute.2
The extent of defendant California Sports' contacts with
Utah were "exhibition and scouting ventures and nation-wide
548 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1977). Eckles was trustee in bankruptcy for Mountain States
Sports, owner of the Utah Stars basketball team. In the action, he alleged that defendant
California Sports, Inc. had tortiously induced William Sharman to breach his coaching
contract with the Utah Stars and sign a new contract with the Los Angeles Lakers.
2 UTAH CODe ANN. § 78-27-22 (Supp. 1971). Long-arm statutes are state statutes
conferring upon courts jurisdiction over a party not served with process if the party has
constitutionally sufficient contacts within the state. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
telecasts,"'3 and this was sufficient contact for the Utah trial court
to sustain in personam jurisdiction over the California corpora-
tion.
The Tenth Circuit approved this exercise of jurisdiction,
stating simply that "there were sufficient direct contacts,"4 but
the court did not state whether any of the three activities by the
out-of-state corporation (exhibition and scouting ventures or na-
tionwide telecasts) standing alone would have satisfied the
"minimum contacts" requirement.5
The "minimum contact" criteria were set forth in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.' The Supreme Court has
ruled that the contacts need not give rise to the cause of action.7
The trial court in the case at the bar acknowledged this, and
correctly gave little or no credence to the fact that California
Sports' contacts in Utah were unrelated to the alleged induce-
ment of Sharman to breach his contract.
International Shoe permits extension of in personam juris-
diction to a nonresident if there are minimum contacts, and if
local maintenance of the suit would not offend traditional stan-
dards of fair play.8 The Tenth Circuit noted with approval that
the trial court had indeed applied "the twin tests of fairness-
reasonableness to the defendant on the one side and territorial
respect for sister states' due spheres on the other."9
B. Venue
In First Security Bank of Utah v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co., '0 the Tenth Circuit considered the application of two venue
statutes" in a diversity action brought to recover a bond.
548 F.2d at 908.
Id.
If scouting ventures and nationwide telecasts are sufficient contacts, it would seem
that all or most professional sports teams would be susceptible to in personam jurisdiction
in all states with similar long-arm statutes.
326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
548 F.2d at 908.
Id.
" 541 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1976).
II Relevant sections are as follows:
28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1970) provides:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship
may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where
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The case had been transferred for improper venue from the
United District Court for the Northern Division of Utah to the
Central Division "for the convenience of parties and witnesses
and in the interest of justice."' 2 It was later dismissed for failure
to state a claim.
The Tenth Circuit, in applying 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 and 1393,
stated that defendant Aetna was a resident and therefore could
be sued in the Northern Division as well as the Central Division
"because it is licensed to do business throughout the state."'3
Such residency made venue in the Northern Division proper,"
and the Tenth Circuit set aside the dismissal. The case was re-
transferred to the Northern Division.
all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1970) provides:
(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or
licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded
as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.
28 U.S.C. § 1393(a) (1970) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided, any civil action, not of a local nature, against a
single defendant in a district containing more than one division must be brought in the
division where he resides.
" 541 F.2d at 870.
" Id. at 871.
" The Tenth Circuit cited Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Seattle, 159 F. Supp. 722 (W.D.
Wash. 1958), "as holding that a corporation is a resident for venue purposes of any division
in which it is incorporated, or licensed to do business, or is doing business." 541 F.2d at
871.
" In Cassity v. R.J. Connor, Inc., No. 76-1704 (10th Cir., Apr. 14, 1977) (Not for
Routine Publication), the Tenth Circuit considered the jurisdictional mandate of 40
U.S.C. § 270b(b) (1970), a section of the Miller Act, which requires that performance
bonds be posted by persons doing certain kinds of contract work for the United States
government. Cassity filed suit against R.J. Connor, Inc. and its surety, seeking an award
from the performance bond. However, the suit was filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, not in Nevada where the contract in dispute was performed.
Id. at 2.
Citing McDaniel v. University of Chicago, 812 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1975), the Tenth
Circuit held that 40 U.S.C. § 270b(b) requires that the suit be instituted in "any district
in which the contract was to be performed and executed and not elsewhere . I..." d  at
6. The Utah trial court therefore was correct in dismissing the matter for lack of jurisdic-
tion, since no part of the contract had been performed in Utah.
Plaintiff had argued that the wording of section 270b(b) was merely a venue require-
ment and that the matter could be brought in any United States district court. Id. at 4.
In rejecting that logic, the Tenth Circuit said that the statutory language was to be strictly
construed. Further, the Tenth Circuit noted that the language of the statute was a clear
statement of Congress' intention as to venue and jurisdiction. Id. at 7.
Secondarily, the Tenth Circuit rejected Cassity's contention that defendant had
waived its right to object to improper venue because it had appeared in the case and had




In Napier v. Gertrude,8 the Tenth Circuit outlined the cir-
cumstances under which a class action may or may not proceed
after the named plaintiffs claim has been declared moot.
The named plaintiff, a "child in need of supervision" accord-
ing to a state adjudication, sought habeas corpus release alleging
that she was being held in a state institution under an unconstitu-
tionally vague statute. 7
The Tenth Circuit upheld the statute and denied habeas
corpus, saying that her intervening release from custody had
mooted the action. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit said the ac-
tion was mooted as to the class because the class was not yet
certified and the failure to certify, while attributable to a trial
error, was not now correctable. 8
In stating that criterion, the Tenth Circuit rejected the trial
court's more simplistic logic that the request for a class action
becomes moot when the merits are determined against the named
plaintiff." Should the non certification error of the trial court now
be corrected, permitting the class to go forward without the
named plaintiff?
. The Tenth Circuit answered the question, applying a test
that considered whether the cause of action was "capable of repe-
tition, yet evading review." 0 Quoting from Sosna v. Iow a, ' the
Tenth Circuit stated:
There may be cases in which the controversy involving the
named plaintiffs is such that it becomes moot as to them before the
District Court can reasonably be expected to rule on a certification
' 542 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977).
' Id. at 826.
" Id. at 827-28.
Nothing in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indicates
the merits of the case should be determinative of whether the class should
be certified .... Class determination does not become 'moot' when the merits
are determined against the named plaintiff .... [C]lass members maintain
a vital interest in the outcome of any possible appeal. Also, a judgment in a
class action is not intended for use only to benefit class members when the
representative prevails but is meant to preclude them from further litigating
the issue when it is decided against them.
Id. at 827.
" Id. at 828.
" 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
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motion. In such instances, whether the certification can be said to
"relate back" to the filing of the complaint may depend upon the
circumstances of the particular case and especially the reality of
the claim that otherwise the issue would evade review (emphasis
added).
The Tenth Circuit said that the issue in the case at the bar
would not evade review, as members of the class would in some
instances "be in state custody for several years and could main-
tain a personal adverse interest throughout the course of litiga-
tion." Therefore the class could not go forward in the face of
mootness as to the named plaintiff.
D. Retention of Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy
In Tilco Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp. ,24 the Tenth Circuit stated
that the trial court properly retained jurisdiction over a Chapter
X bankruptcy so that the trustee could reject executory contracts
of the debtor well after the assets had been transferred from the
debtor.
Ordinarily, it would be expected that the trustee's standing
to seek rejection of such executory contracts (for the sale of natu-
ral gas) would expire with the bankruptcy's "closing agreement"
and the trustee's transfer of the bankrupt's assets.2 However, the
Tenth Circuit stated that the trustee had retained standing be-
cause the reorganization plan recognized that the trustee might
seek rejection of the executory contracts. Moreover, the bank-
ruptcy court had approved the closing agreement, "which obli-
gated the Trustee to seek rejection of the executory contracts.
2
The Tenth Circuit noted that the Bankruptcy Actr provides
that property transferred according to the reorganization plan be
free of debtors', creditors' or stockholders' claims "except such
claims and interests as may otherwise be provided for in the plan
or in the order confirming the plan or in the order directing or
authorizing the transfer or retention of such property."'
= 542 F.2d at 828.
SId.
' 558 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1371.
SId.
11 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1970).
558 F.2d at 1372.
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Thus, reorganization courts "have been permitted to retain
jurisdiction after transfer of assets to assure the consummation
of the approved plan." 9
E. Relations Between Federal Courts and the Military
In Schulke v. United States,30 the Tenth Circuit held that an
action for mandamus relief3' was not available to direct a general
court-martial against military personnel.32 The court noted that
a decision whether to prefer military charges against military
personnel is discretionary33 and an internal military affair.3 , Cit-
ing a number of prior cases, 35 the court held that "[t]he role of
the federal judiciary" in such cases was "narrow and restricted. 3 ,
F. Federal-State Jurisdiction Conflicts
The Tenth Circuit considered the propriety of a state court
injunction of federal proceedings in Aluminum Products Distrib-
utors, Inc. v. Aaacon Auto Transport, Inc. 37 Although the case
mainly concerned the validity of a contract arbitration clause, the
jurisdictional question arose when the defendant, Aaacon, unsuc-
29 Id.
- 544 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
Sergeant Schulke had sought to bring court-martial proceedings against former
President Richard M. Nixon in 1973. Shortly thereafter, he was referred to Fitzsimmons
Army Hospital in Denver for psychiatric evaluation. After being returned to active duty,
he sought courts-martial against the persons responsible for his hospitalization; after
exhausting the military channels, he filed the instant suit in federal court. 544 F.2d at
454-55.
3 Mandamus is not appropriate when the act sought to be compelled is discretionary.
See, e.g., Scarafiotti v. Shea, 456 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff had sought notice
before issuance of an I.R.S. summons to a third party).
3 544 F.2d at 455.
" E.g., Arnheiter v. Chafee, 435 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1970) (unsuccessful attempt by
plaintiff to convene a court of inquiry to investigate his relief from command Vietnam
War); Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969) (refusal to review reserve commander's
decision that plaintiff's hair was too long; holding, however, that the Army must abide
by its own regulations; 406 F.2d at 146); Moore v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163 (D. Colo.
1974) (after writing a series of letters to Congress, plaintiff was relieved of his teaching
duties and given psychiatric examinations; no showing, however, of abuse of discretion).
" 544 F.2d at 455. Several months later, Sergeant Schulke was back before the Tenth
Circuit, this time attempting to force the Lowry Airman, the base newspaper, to print
several advertisements requesting congressional candidates to state their views on
"redress of grievances by military personnel." The court held that his suit must fail for
the same jurisdictional defects faced by his earlier suit. Schulke v. United States, No. 76-
1565 (10th Cir., Mar. 1, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication) at 2, 4.
549 F.2d 1381 (10th Cir. 1977).
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cessfully maintained that the district court" must give full faith
and credit39 to a prior New York state court decision 0 that the
arbitration clause was valid. The Tenth Circuit held that
Donovan v. City of Dallas,4' which held that a state court could
not enjoin an in personam action in federal court, was "the com-
plete answer" to the issued raised.2
In Donovan, the Supreme Court did not decide whether a
plea of res judicata could bar the federal proceeding, where the
state court determination went to the merits.43 Unfortunately,
Aaacon failed to plead res judicata, relying solely on its full faith
and credit argument. Although the Tenth Circuit noted that the
full faith and credit argument was distinct from a plea of res
judicata, it refused to consider the effect of a successful plea by
Aaacon,44 and thus did not expand the Donovan decision in this
regard.
The Tenth Circuit also held that federal district courts have
no jurisdiction to review a state's refusal to admit a law school
graduate to the bar, in Doe v. Pringle.5 The trial court had dis-
missed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, distin-
guishing between "constitutional challenge[s] to the state's gen-
eral rules and regulations governing admission," where federal
courts do have federal question jurisdiction, and claims, whether
or not based on constitutional grounds, that "the state has unlaw-
fully denied a particular applicant admission."4
In an opinion by Judge Barrett, the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the trial court's dismissal, holding that Doe's only remedy was
3' The plaintiff had originally tiled suit in Oklahoma state court. Aaacon removed the
case to the Western District of Oklahoma, on the ground that original federal jurisdiction
lay under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970), dealing with cases arising under acts of Congress
relating to commerce. 549 F.2d at 1382.
" See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
" Before removal, Aaacon filed suit in New York state court to compel arbitration.
549 F.2d at 1383.
" 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
" 549 F.2d at 1383.
377 U.S. at 412.
" 549 F.2d at 1384.
550 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1976). Doe, a convicted felon, was denied admission to the
Colorado bar " 'on the basis of the proofs submitted on [his] ethical and moral qualifi-




review of the Colorado Supreme Court's decision by certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court.47
Cases in this area can be divided into two classes: those
dealing with refusal of admission to a state's bar, and those deal-
ing with state disbarment. In the latter cases, although a federal
trial court may not directly review the state disbarment, it may
nevertheless re-examine the grounds for state disbarment in de-
termining whether federal disbarment will follow." As a result,
these cases are not directly on point with the issue in Doe, al-
though Judge Barrett's opinion does not draw a clear distinction
and, in fact, relies heavily on Theard v. United States," a disbar-
ment case.
Three of the cited cases dealing with disbarment involved
attempted direct review of the state disbarment, the respective
circuit courts of appeals holding that certiorari to the Supreme
Court was the only appropriate means of review ° However, in a
Supreme Court opinion not cited by Judge Barrett, Selling v.
Radford,51 the Court, while reviewing a federal disbarment, gave
some indication that it would not review a state disbarment pro-
ceeding, even on certiorari. 5 Theard, which reached the Supreme
Court through the federal system, was also a review of a federal
disbarment. It would therefore appear that the disbarment cases
provide poor precedent for the issues raised in Doe.
Two companion cases concerning review of an admission
denial, Konigsberg v. State Bar5" and Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners," actually reached the Supreme Court on certiorari
from the state courts. In neither case, however, did the Court
specifically state that this was the only proper method of review.
Of the cases cited by Judge Barrett concerning a challenge to a
general admission requirement, only one, Keenan v. Board of
"7 Id. at 597, 599.
0 Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957); Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46
(1917).
, 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969);
Ginger v. Circuit Court, 372 F.2d 621 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 935 (1967); Gately
v. Sutton, 310 F.2d 107 (10th Cir. 1962).
" 243 U.S. 46 (1917).
" Id. at 50.
353 U.S. 252 (1957).
353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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Law Examiners,55 actually discussed the federal jurisdiction
issue.5
Nevertheless, Judge Barrett's opinion is consistent with
every case cited, and is clearer on the jurisdictional issue than
most.57 It represents the logical, if not inevitable, explication of
precedent in the area and should be of great assistance to courts
in the future in resolving state bar admission issues.58
II. PROCEDURE
A. Rules 12(b) and 56(c)
In American Home Assurance Co. v. Cessna Aircraft Co."9
and Torres v. First State Bank,60 the Tenth Circuit addressed
itself to a common misapplication of rule 12(b)(6) by the district
courts; trial courts often "receive, and do not exclude, matters
outside the pleadings and then grant a motion to dismiss rather
than a summary judgement"'" as required by rule 12(b).
In Torres, plaintiff brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
317 F. Supp. 1350, 1353 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (challenge to residency requirement for
admission to North Carolina bar).
- In other cases, federal jurisdiction was either presumed or the issue was quickly
settled with little or no discussion. See Feldman v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 438 F.2d
699 (8th Cir. 1971) (challenge to bar examination grading procedures); Goldsmith v.
Pringle, 399 F. Supp. 620 (D. Colo. 1975) (challenge to Colorado reciprocity rule); Huff-
man v. Montana Supreme Court, 372 F. Supp. 1175 (D. Mont. 1974) (challenge to Mon-
tana's diploma privilege).
" After holding that the federal courts had no subject matter jurisdiction in the case,
Judge Barrett went on in Part II of the opinion to discuss a number of recent Supreme
Court opinions restricting federal jurisdiction in civil rights cases. This lengthy-and
totally gratuitous-discussion probably prompted the two concurrences by Judges Brei-
tenstein and Seth, 550 F.2d at 604, which would have limited the holding to lack of subject
matter jurisdiction over denial of admission to a state bar.
I In a third case concerning federal-state jurisdictional conflicts, Wright v. Douglas,
No. 76-1419 (10th Cir., Aug. 29, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication), the Tenth Circuit
held that the entire suit was barred in federal court by the eleventh amendment. This was
a diversity action for wrongful death, brought against the State of Wyoming, the project
supervisor (Douglas) and the principal contractor (Rissler & McMurry Co.) of a highway
construction project. The court noted that a waiver of sovereign immunity by a state in
state courts does not waive its eleventh amendment immunity in federal courts, id. at 4,
and that a suit against a state employee acting in his official capacity (defendant Douglas)
is also barred, because it seeks a judgment from state funds. Id. at 7. Finally, Wyoming's
common law of sovereign immunity extended to the contractor, and therefore the federal
court was totally without jurisdiction in this case. Id. at 10-11.
s' 551 F.2d 804 (10th Cir. 1977).




(1970) against the defendant bank. Defendant moved for dis-
missal pursuant to rule 12(b)(6). Although the trial court received
depositions and exhibits which it did not exclude, it granted de-
fendant's motion. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the
complaint adequately alleged a violation of section 1983, that the
good faith of the bank was in issue, and that the good faith issue
could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss.2
Judge Breitenstein stated the applicable law as follows: (1)
When matters outside the pleadings are presented and not ex-
cluded, the court must treat the motion as one for summary judg-
ment pursuant to rule 56;13 (2) noncompliance with the provisions
of rule 56 deprives the court of authority to grant summary judg-
ment.6"
Since the district court had accepted material outside the
pleadings and had not complied with the provisions of rule 56(c),
one would expect that the inquiry would end there-with reversal
of the district court's decision to grant the 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. But the Tenth Circuit continued its analysis, stating the
rule: "If, as a matter of law, the complaint, without consideration
of matter presented but not excluded, is insufficient, a motion to
dismiss is proper." 5 The Tenth Circuit found that the complaint
was sufficient in this case.
The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the Torres rule in the
American Home Assurance"6 case. That case, a diversity action,
involved substantive questions of Montana state law and pre-
sented essentially the identical issue raised by Torres. Judge
Breitenstein stated that if the trial court did not consider matters
outside of the pleadings, the question was whether Montana law
permitted plaintiff's recovery. 7 The Tenth Circuit concluded
that material questions of fact existed which could not be decided
on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 8
0 Id. at 1257.
0 Id. This well settled principle is expressly stated by the last sentence of rule 12(b).
Accord, Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 671 (1972).
" 550 F.2d at 1257. See Adams v. Campbell County School Dist., 483 F.2d 1351 (10th
Cir. 1973).
550 F.2d at 1257 (emphasis added). See text accompanying note 69 infra.
661 F. 2d 804 (10th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 807.
" Id. at 808.
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Since both Torres and American Home Assurance were re-
versed despite the Tenth Circuit's inquiry into the possibility of
accepted outside material not being considered, it can be hypoth-
esized that the court was merely adding boiler plate to its decision
and did not create an exception to the general rule that where
outside materials are accepted the trial court must proceed to
rule 56. But the Torres decision casts doubt on that hypothesis
by citing Utah State University v. Bear, Stearns & Company."
In that case, upon defendant's filing a motion to dismiss, support-
ing affidavits were filed on each side. The Tenth Circuit did not
articulate its reasoning, but held that the granting of a rule 12(c)
motion for judgment on the pleadings was proper.
Thus, the Tenth Circuit has apparently created an exception
to the rule that a 12(b) motion cannot be granted after outside
materials have been received and not excluded. The court's new
rule leads to confusion, since it is difficult to know whether the
trial judge considered matters received and not excluded. In any
event, since a plaintiff is normally free to amend his complaint
upon dismissal under rule 12(b)(6), the Torres rule will probably
not be prejudicial to future plaintiffs affected by it.70
B. Statutory Interpleader
In General Atomic Co. v. Duke Power Co., 7' plaintiff General
Atomic, a seller of uranium concentrates, sought subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335 statutory interpleader,2
alleging that there were adverse claims between two or more of
the defendants for uranium in which plaintiff had rights. The
Tenth Circuit ruled that the trial court properly decided it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the "exacting demands ' 7 3
of the statute: the res was not under the control of the person
- 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1977).
70 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357 (1969).
71 553 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1977).
" Named as defendants were four utility companies, with whom plaintiff was under
contract to sell uranium, and United Nuclear Corporation. United Nuclear was under
contract to supply plaintiff with the quantity of uranium required to fulfill plaintiff's
contracts with the utilities. (United Nuclear had been the direct supplier to the four
utilities but had assigned its rights under the contracts to General Atomic. United Nuclear
retained its duties under the contracts). The lawsuit arose when United Nuclear claimed
it was entitled to be released from its obligations under the supply contract or that it was
entitled to receive current (inflated) market prices.
7 553 F.2d at 56.
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bringing the lawsuit,7" but was in the possession of United Nu-
clear; secondly, the suit lacked the element of competing claim-
ants75 since United Nuclear was not asserting entitlement to any-
thing General Atomic had tendered to the district court and be-
cause the four utilities were not competing among themselves for
the benefit of their individual contracts.
The Tenth Circuit recognized that as a result of the dis-
missal, plaintiff would be subject to a number of lawsuits involv-
ing the potential of conflicting adjudications. But the court con-
cluded that Congress did not intend that interpleader be a cure-
all for every multi-party relationship, citing State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Tashire.6
The court's holding that the action was lacking in adverse
claimants may be criticized; a more liberal77 reading of the stat-
ute could have supported a ruling that United Nuclear's claim
was adverse to the claims of the utility companies. The utilities
claimed that they were entitled to the uranium at the agreed-
upon prices; United Nuclear claimed that it could retain the
uranium or sell it elsewhere unless it received higher prices. The
Tenth Circuit conceded that if General Atomic had the material
in its possession the parties might have met the adversary claim-
ants requirement.7"
C. Rule 37: Failure to Comply With a Discovery Order
In Glezos v. Blackett,79 the trial court granted plaintiff's mo-
tion for a default judgment, citing defendant's failure to file an
answer to interrogatories in compliance with law. 0
" 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(2) (1970) requires plaintiff to deposit the money, property, or
obligation sought by the adverse claimants or to deposit a bond payable to the clerk of
the court.
75 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (a)(a) (1970) requires that two or more adverse claimants claim
to be entitled to the money, property, or bond deposited by the plaintiff.
70 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
17 The court stated that plaintiff's theory did not satisfy the "exacting demands" of
the statute. See text accompanying note 73 supra. Other courts have held that the statute
should be read liberally. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523
(1967). See also 7 C. Waor & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1704 (1972).
, 553 F.2d at 57.
' No. 76-1225 (10th Cir., Apr. 25, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
Plaintiff filed a motion for an order compelling an answer on August 18, 1975.
Defendant filed an answer on August 25, 1975. When defendant failed to respond to
plaintiff's motion for production of documents and plaintiff's interrogatories on the agreed
day, the court ordered that the interrogatories be answered and the documents produced.
VOL. 55
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Under rule 37, trial judges have authority to enter default
judgments in cases where a party fails to comply with a discovery
order.8  The question presented in Glezos was whether the trial
judge abused his discretion" in granting the default judgment
under the stated facts. The Tenth Circuit held that the trial court
did abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff's motion for default
judgment.
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that dismissal as a sanction
should be applied only in extreme cases"3 since the Rules of Civil
Procedure favor ultimate determinations on the merits. The court
ruled that where noncompliance is not willful or in bad faith, but
is merely technical, a default judgment should not be granted."
Arguably, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this
case. There is little in the Tenth Circuit's opinion to indicate
that the defendant's noncompliance was inadvertent or was due
to an inability to comply. The opinion does not disclose whether
defendant ever complied with the order for production of docu-
ments. On the other hand, the trial court could have imposed one
or more of the less stringent sanctions available under rule 37.55
D. Rule 42: Consolidation for Settlement
American Employers' Insurance Co. v. King Resources Co. 6
was an appeal by John M. King (King) of a district court's en
Within the time allowed, defendant filed answers to the interrogatories, but they were
signed by defendant's attorney rather than defendant (rule 33(a) requires that interrogato-
ries to a party be signed by the party served).
The Tenth Circuit did not make clear whether defendant complied with plaintiff's
motion for production of documents.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C), 37(d).
a E.g., 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2284 (1969).
See, e.g., Murphy v. Fatzer, No. 76-1265 (10th Cir., June 1, 1977) (Not for Routine
Publication). In Murphy, plaintiff, a law school graduate, appeared pro se. Plaintiff's
answers to interrogatories were ruled not responsive and plaintiff was ordered to give
further answers. Plaintiff failed to comply. Defendant's initial motion to dismiss was
denied, but plaintiff was again ordered to answer defendant's interrogatories. Again,
plaintiff failed to comply with the order. The trial court's subsequent dismissal was upheld
by the Tenth Circuit.
"' See Robinson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 368 F.2d 37 (10th Cir. 1966).
" While any failure to comply with a discovery order brings rule 37 sanctions into
play, the reason for the failure is to be considered in determining which sanction is
appropriate. The Tenth Circuit determined that the eventual compliance, though techni-
cally imperfect, was sufficient to make default judgment inappropriate.
- 545 F.2d 1265 (1976). The nine actions included securities fraud cases, reorganiza-
tion proceedings, bankruptcies, and a rescission action.
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banc denial of his motion to consolidate nine actions "for pur-
poses of settlement only. '"87
The Tenth Circuit found that in the King case it would be
difficult for a judge to be impartial and fair8 to all of the parties
while trying to settle nine actions with interrelated facts and
facets."
While the involvement of John King provided a common
thread among the several actions, the Tenth Circuit found no
common question of law or fact, a requisite for consolidation
under rule 42. King was involved in each case, but in varying
degrees. Even though King was not predicating his motion to
consolidate on a common basis of fact or law, but rather "for
purposes of settlement only,"" the Tenth Circuit found no final-
ity to any of the actions and a settlement, given their develop-
ment to that point, might be unfair because of the many unre-
solved matters related to the nine actions.'
Citing NAACP of Louisiana v. Michot,12 the court noted that
denial of a motion to consolidate had been held to be a nonap-
pealable order. 3
For all of the above reasons, the Tenth Circuit upheld the
denial of King's motion to consolidate for purposes of settlement
only.
E. Relief from Extraordinary Actions by the Trial Court
In Circle v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 4 before the Tenth Cir-
cuit for the third time, petitioners sought a writ of certiorari to
review the district court's action in the case and asked for re-
moval of the trial judge . 5 After a second remand from the Tenth
"7 Id. at 1269.
" For this part of its decision, the court relied on 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970) as amended
by P.L. 93-512: "Any justice . . . shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Id. at 1268.
0 Id. In United Family Life Ins. Co. v. Barrow, 452 F.2d 997 (10th Cir. 1971), a
Chapter XI action and suit for recovery on life insurance policies, the court held that the
interrelationship of the actions precluded assigning them to one judge.
0 545 F.2d at 1269.
I Id.
92 480 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1973).
545 F.2d at 1269. Judge McWilliams, in a specially concurring opinion, would have
denied the motion on this ground alone. 545 F.2d at 1270.
" No. 77-1293 (10th Cir., June 9, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
0 When the complaint was originally filed, the case was assigned to a district judge
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Circuit, in this class action suit, the trial court was still express-
ing doubt as to the appropriateness of a class action and further
indicated at a pretrial conference that it was "his intention to
start from the beginning as if the two decisions of the Tenth
Circuit had never been written.""6 He refused to acknowledge as
controlling the previous holdings of the Tenth Circuit in the case.
Because of the delay involved in such actions by the trial court
judge and the resulting unfairness from the judge's seeming pre-
dilection for one result-no class action-the Tenth Circuit
ordered the judge removed from the case.
Because of the repeated filing of frivolous claims 7 by plain-
tiff, in Miller v. Continental Oil Co."' the district court tried to
enjoin plaintiff from filing any further actions without obtaining
the court's prior approval. The Tenth Circuit pointed out that
there are sanctions for abusing process. While the Tenth Circuit
upheld the district court's dismissal of the action against the
defendants,100 it directed the district court to vacate that part of
its decision which attempted to deny plaintiff free access to the
courts.
F. Res Judicata
Katzburg v. Krebs'01 involved an action between stockhold-
ers in a New Mexico corporation. The action, originating in state
court and later removed to the federal court, was based on fraud,
conspiracy and violation of a fiduciary duty.' 2 The trial court
who denied certification of the requested class action, ordered the district court to reconsi-
der the class action motion and to give reasons for its refusal to certify. Id.
When the action again came before the trial court, a class action was again denied
and the case was dismissed. Id. at 3. The Tenth Circuit remanded the case a second time,
ruling that it had been dismissed on erroneous grounds and that, contrary to the district
court's holding, the case was a classic one for class action treatment. Id.
" Id.
0 Plaintiff made 17 appeals to the Tenth Circuit, eight in one year alone. Plaintiff
also had a history of refusing to appear at hearings, either in person or represented by
counsel.
" No. 76-1229 (10th Cir., Feb. 2, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
" Id. at 3.
I' Id. at 2.
'o' 545 F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1976).
The plaintiff and defendants had formed a corporation in New Mexico for the
production of Christmas ornaments. The corporation began experiencing financial diffi-
culties. The defendant, Erika Krebs, was authorized by the board of directors to negotiate
with the bank for a settlement. She did reach an agreement with the bank on behalf of
her family, but not the corporation. Through a judicially approved sale, the collateral was
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granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants; the Tenth
Circuit reversed. 1
03
The trial court based its res judicata finding on a judicially
approved sale of the collateral in an action brought by the lender
against the corporation.'"4 The Tenth Circuit stated that the doc-
trine of res judicata was inapplicable. After considering the pur-
pose of the res judicata-collateral estoppel doctrine,0 5 the Tenth
Circuit determined that a comparison of the two proceedings
must be made. Through this analysis, the court found there was
an identity neither of parties nor of causes of action. The first
proceeding was between the lender and the corporation on an
overdue note; the second action, between directors of the corpora-
tion, was based on fraud and conspiracy. Under these circum-
stances, res judicata was not applicable and the summary judg-
ment was an error.'08
Johnson v. City of Wheat Ridge'"7 involved an action brought
sold to a limited partnership, owned by the defendants. The plaintiff, a director in the
New Mexico corporation, brought this action asserting that the defendants had breached
their fiduciary duty by purchasing the corporation assets for their own benefit. In other
courts, the plaintiff sought to have a constructive trust placed on the properties acquired




"I Id. at 108-09. The Tenth Circuit stated that the rule of res judicata provides that
a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction binds the parties to the action and their privies with regard to every issue that
was or might have been raised. However, if the second proceeding is upon a different cause
of action between the same parties, there is an estoppel upon only the controverted issues
which were the basis of the prior judgment.
IN Another case, Burch v. Stringham & Follet, No. 76-1223 (10th Cir., Apr. 22, 1977)
(Not for Routine Publication), involved a federal action arising under various rules and
regulations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77-78 (1970). The trial
court dismissed the action under the doctrine of res judicata. The state court had dis-
missed an earlier complaint involving the same parties, stating that the state statute did
not provide a remedy. No. 76-1223 at 2.
In discussing the doctrine of res judicata, the Tenth Circuit stated that the first ruling
must be a judgment on the merits. Id. at 5 (citing Commissioner v. Sunnen, 33 U.S. 591
(1948)). If the second cause of action between the same parties contains different issues,
then there is an estoppel with regard to the controverted points which were the basis of
the first finding or verdict. No. 76-1223 at 5.
The Tenth Circuit in reversing the district court judgment determined that res judi-
cata was not applicable in this case; the cause of action in the state court was different.
Secondly, the state court had no jurisdiction to consider the federal cause of action, and
therefore there had been no decision on the federal merits in the state action. Id. at 6.
707 No. 76-1526 (10th Cir., Jan. 3, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
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by the executor of an estate alleging deprivation of property and
due process violations of the fifth and fourteenth amendment.
The property which was the subject of the federal cause of action
had been involved in a quiet title action between the same parties
in the state court. A determination was reached by the state court
that the property was validly donated. 08
The Tenth Circuit applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel
and affirmed the district court decision. 09 Though the causes of
action were different, the issues, underlying facts, and parties
were identical. The Tenth Circuit stated that it would be contrary
to the policies underlying res judicata and collateral estoppel to
allow such similar actions to be brought in the federal and state
court.,10
G. Privacy of Jury Deliberations
In Crowley v. Cloes"' the plaintiff brought a wrongful death
action as administratrix of the estate of William F. Crowley, Jr." '
The verdict form given to the jury allowed a consideration of the
negligence of Crowley and Cloes, but not of a third party to the
accident, Harris. After the jury had begun its deliberations, the
trial judge and counsel for both parties decided at a meeting in
chambers that the verdict form was erroneous. After the jury
returned a verdict based on the first form and was polled, the
court explained the error in the verdict form. While the jury
members were still in court, grouped around the bench, they were
given a second verdict form which allowed for a consideration of
Harris' negligence. The court indicated the differences in the
forms. Jurors signed the new form in open court, they were then
polled again, and discharged. There were no deliberations on the
new form."'
'~' Id. at 2.
" Id. at 3.
10 Id., citing Spence v. Latting, 512 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
893; Lavasek v. White, 339 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1965).
No. 76-1232 (March 15, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
1 This wrongful death action was brought under the Oklahoma comparative negli-
gence statute, OKLA. STAT. tit. 23 § 11 (Supp. 1973). The deceased and defendant Cloes
had parked on a rural road at night. Though Cloes noticed an approaching car a quarter
of a mile or more away, he failed to warn the deceased who was standing behind the car,
until the oncoming vehicle was about 100 feet away. The deceased was struck by a truck
driven by Harris. Plaintiff settled with Harris pursuant to a covenent not to sue and
asserted a claim of negligence against Cloes. No. 76-1232 at 2-3.
"I Id. at 4-5.
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The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the case."' The
court considered the issue of the privacy of jury deliberations and
found an invasion of that privacy, finding no federal precedent for
the deliberation process which took place."'
The Tenth Circuit also found that the trial court's good faith
participation resulted in a directed verdict, as a practicality.",
The consequence of the trial court's failure to return the jury to
further secret deliberations on the second verdict form and its
participation in the voting process constituted an impermissible
invasion of an exclusive province of the jury.'17
H. Judgment N.O.V.
In Yazzie v. Sullivent '5  the Tenth Circuit considered
whether the district court properly granted judgment notwith-
standing the verdict."9 The case was submitted to the jury which
returned a verdict for the plaintiff for wrongful death. The trial
court then granted the defendants' motion for judgment n.o.v. on
the basis of insufficient evidence of a causal relation between the
negligent driving of Sullivent and Yazzie's death.20
"' Id. at 8.
"' Id. at 6. The trial court participated in the voting process of the second verdict
form, though authority indicates that the status of the vote is not to be disclosed to anyone
prior to rendering a verdict or reaching a deadlock. Id. at 6-7. The Tenth Circuit cited
United States v. Sexton, 456 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1972); Benscoter v. United States, 376 F.2d
49 (10th Cir. 1967); Mullin v. United States, 356 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The trial court is not permitted to ask questions or make suggestions after the jury
begins its deliberations. No. 76-1232 at 7 (citing Castleberry v. NRM Corp., 470 F.2d 1113
(10th Cir. 1972).
III No. 76-1232 at 7.
17 Id. at 8.
"I Yazzie v. Sullivent, 561 F.2d 183 (10th Cir. 1977), rev'd on rehearing, No. 75-1619
(10th Cir., Oct. 6, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
"' The defendant Sullivent was the driver of a tractor trailer rig which allegedly
struck the decedent Yazzie and apparently dragged his body 18 to 20 miles. Sullivent was
arrested for, and admitted, to drunken driving. Evidence showed erratic driving. Blood-
stains were found on the side-board racks of the trailer, on the mud flaps, and on the rear
guard. A discernible trail of blood and body parts extended along the highway. Near the
beginning of the trail, Yazzie's blookstained shirt sleeve was discovered slightly off the
road and between two tracks of the trailer rig. Significantly, there was no direct testimony
concerning the accident and Sullivent claimed to know nothing about any contact with
the body of Yazzie.
I" In a memorandum opinion denying the plaintiffs motion for a new trial, the New
Mexico District Court stated:
At its most favorable, plaintiffs evidence showed that defendant Sulliv-
ent was driving his truck in a negligent manner, and that decedent's body
came into contact with the truck and was dragged by the truck for a number
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On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the majority upheld the
judgment n.o.v. in an opinion written by Judge Barrett, with
Judge Doyle dissenting.' On rehearing the court reversed, and
Judge Doyle, writing for the majority, held that the district court
erred in setting aside the jury's verdict.
2 2
Judge Barrett and Judge Doyle differ on the role of inference
in showing causation and the legitimacy of the inferences drawn
from the facts in Yazzie. 123 Since there was no direct evidence of
how the accident occurred, Judge Barrett claimed insufficiency
of evidence.' 24 Furthermore, he maintained that finding. a causal
relationship required piling inferences upon inferences and that
New Mexico law does not permit establishing proof in that way. 125
On the other hand, Judge Doyle urged a broader use of cir-
cumstantial evidence. To sustain the burden of proof, the plain-
tiff need not prove that his own conduct was not a cause. Rather,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to raise a jury question
where the reasonable person could conclude that it is more prob-
able than not that the event was caused by the defendant.'2
of miles. There is no evidence to show how or why decedent's body came into
contact with the truck or even if decedent was alive at the time his body
came into contact with the truck. In short, there is no evidence that dece-
dent's death was proximately caused by defendant Sullivent's negligence.
No. 75-1619 at 4.
' No. 75-1619 (10th Cir., Oct. 6, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
' 561 F.2d 183 (10th Cir. 1977).
123 In granting judgment n.o.v., the court must view the evidence most favorable to
the party against whom the motion is made and give that party the benefit of all reason-
able inferences from the evidence. Judgment n.o.v. should not be granted where the party
against whom the motion is made presents substantial evidence, but more than a scintilla
of evidence is required. Ahrens v. American-Canadian Beaver Co., 458 F.2d 607 (10th Cir.
1972).
4 No. 75-1619 at 6. Judge Barrett refused to find a causal relationship because one
must assume "that Yazzie was walking along the side of the highway in a reasonable
manner, remaining clear of traffic thereon, when Sullivent negligently drove his truck off
the side of the hardtop and struck Yazzie, thereby causing his death." Id. Judge Barrett
proposed alternate explanations that Yazzie was already dead or had crawled into the
spare-tire rack.
11 Id. Judge Barrett cited Adams v. Highland Corp., 450 P.2d 442 (N.M. Ct. App.
1969). However, Wright and Miller do not support the theory of piling inference upon
inference. They state: "There are still traces in the cases of the ancient slogan that an
inference cannot be based on an inference. Modern scholarship has demolished this fallacy
and most courts recognize that there has never been such a rule and, in the nature of
things, could not be." 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2528
(1969). Furthermore, state law ought not to be considered. Id. n.33 at 569.
"' Judge Doyle posited that the sufficiency of evidence is a federal question, and the
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Judge Doyle contended that the most probable theory is that
Yazzie was killed by contact with the truck.' 7 He dismissed the
piling-of-inferences argument and stated that it is the nature of
circumstantial evidence that inferences must be drawn. Judge
Doyle's position seems more persuasive, especially in view of the
philosophy behind judgment n.o.v. of minimum interference with
the jury.
I. Rule 60(b)
Fleming v. Gulf Oil Corp.'28 began in 1972, when Fleming
sued Gulf for misrepresentation of the value of a business that he
agreed to lease from Gulf. In 1974, the Agrico Corp., which had
been assigned Gulf's rights to the lease contract, won a favorable
judgment against Fleming in another suit to recover rentals and
possession under the same lease. Gulf then filed a motion which
was granted to dismiss Fleming's action against Gulf, based on
the argument that the settling of the Agrico-Fleming matter re-
solved the Gulf-Fleming matter. 9
In 1976,130 Fleming filed a motion for relief under rule 60(b)'
31
because of Gulf's failure to notify plaintiff of the 1974 motion to
dismiss. The district court denied the motion and this appeal
followed.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Fleming was entitled to
relief from the judgment. It based the decision on two factors.
First, Gulf had received authorization to supplement the record
on appeal; 13 however, instead of supplementing an existing re-
judge stated the federal standard. 561 F.2d at 188. See Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
359 U.S. 437 (1959); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 696 n.6.
(1962).
'7 "We viewed the speculations as to possibilities such as the decedent being dead
when he was caught up by the trailer or that he had crawled into the spare tire rack as
being no more than guesses or speculations." 561 F.2d at 188.
128 547 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1977).
'2 The motion to dismiss and the order to do so are reprinted. Id. at 909.
" The Tenth Circuit found nothing to indicate that Fleming should have made an
earlier discovery of what had happened to him. Id. at 913.
"I' FED. R. Ctv. P. 60(b) states: "[Tihe court may relieve a party ... from a final
judgment ... for the following reasons: . . . (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment."
'31 Gulf had requested authority to proceed under FED. R. APP. P. 10(c) (allows pre-
paring a new record from the best available means if no report or transcript of the proceed-
ings is available), but no such authority was granted. 547 F.2d at 910.
VOL. 55
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
cord with documents that had been presented in court or that
accurately reflected the previous proceedings, Gulf attempted to
create a new record for the appeal.
33
Secondly, rule 60(b)(6) provides relief from a final judgment
for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment." The judges found that this rule is not limited to fact
situations which would authorize relief under the common law
writs of coram nobis and audita querela. 3 In the opinion of the
Tenth Circuit, failure to give notice to the plaintiff denied him a
fair opportunity to be heard. The case had been disposed of by
the trial court without notice and without legal authority;'35 when
these factors were viewed with the appellee's attempt to create a
new record on appeal, the case was one in which relief should be
granted.
In reversing the dismissal, the Tenth Circuit determined that
the trial judge's "positive participation"'' 3 in the dismissal of
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"= An affidavit of appellant's former attorney was "prepared for the occasion" of the
appeal. Id. at 910. Gulf also presented a deposition of appellant which was represented as
having been prepared in July of 1973 and not transmitted with the original record on
appeal. The reporter's cerification indicated, however, that the deposition was, in fact,
transcribed just before its filing in March, 1977.
"' Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949).
547 F.2d at 913.
"' Id. at 914. The trial judge furnished a document (in which he made findings in
response to the affidavit in the supplemental record) which described what took place in
January of 1974 at the Agrico-Fleming disposition. At that time, the judge concluded that
the Agrico-Fleming matter also disposed of the Fleming-Gulf matter and that the court
and "all parties ... understood" that to be the situation.
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